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Presidents, Profits, Productivity, & Poverty:
A Great Divide between the
Pre- & Post-Reagan U.S. Economy?
RICHARD K. CAPUTO
Yeshiva University-Wilf Campus
Wurzweiler School of Social Work
This paper examined profits, productivity, and poverty in the United States
from 1961 through 2002. Results indicated that the "great divide" thesis
regarding the U.S. economy before and after the Reagan administration
depends on which measure of the economy is the focus of attention. In
addition, on some measures where before and after differences were de-
tected, the nature of those differences was paradoxical. Corporate profits
as a share of national income, for example, were highest in Democratic
rather than Republican administrations and despite the increased income
inequality of the post-Reagan years, individual and family poverty rates
remained relatively constant after edging upward from the 1970s but still
below 1960s highs. Further, findings provide some evidence corroborating
neoclassic economic theory in regard to incentives and productivity and
they present a challenge to activists who equate poverty as a natural or
an inevitable byproduct of the more market-driven fiscal and monetary
policies of the 1980s and 1990s.
Key words: economy, profits, production, poverty, Reagan administra-
tion, presidents
This paper examined profits, productivity, and poverty in
the United States from 1961, with the onset of the Kennedy ad-
ministration, through 2002, the first two years of the GW Bush
administration. It focused on these and other macroeconomic
measures by presidential terms to determine the nature and ex-
tent of economic life in the U.S. about twenty years before and
after the Reagan administration. The paper was guided in part
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by classical economic theory, which predicts that greater levels
of productivity would be accompanied by increased corporate
profits and income inequality, but also decreased poverty, and
in part by contemporary fiscal policy informed by neoclassical
economic theory, which predicts that readjusting tax incentives
would promote greater levels of productivity (Fullerton, 1994;
Smith, 1994/1776; Stiglitz, 2003). It tests the thesis that the Reagan
administration can be viewed as a "great divide" in the sense that
this and subsequent administrations relied more explicitly and
ideologically on market mechanisms and increased productivity
rather than on government programs per se to address social
problems, with poverty reduction viewed as a natural byproduct
of a dynamic economy (Anderson, 1988; Economic Report of the
President, 1994; Feldstein, 1994a; Gilbert, 2002; Gilbert & Gilbert,
1989; Madrick, 2003).
In 1965, President Johnson declared a war on poverty. Sev-
eral presidential policy advisors during the Johnson administra-
tion such as James Tobin and Robert Lampman proclaimed the
prospects of eliminating poverty by 1980 (Iceland, 2003). During
the 1970s, however, the U.S. experienced relatively double-digit
inflation and nearly double-digit unemployment rates. Concern
about poverty as a national problem, however, receded, especially
after failures by Congress to pass President Nixon's Family As-
sistance Plan in 1969 and again in 1972. By the 1980s, President
Reagan had declared that poverty won the war launched by
President Johnson, that in effect government efforts failed and
may have even exacerbated the problem. The Reagan admin-
istration stressed deregulation of market related activities and
devolution of federal responsibilities of domestic policies and
programs either to lower levels of government or to the private
sector. States began experimenting with ways to promote greater
labor force participation among welfare recipients. The Family
Support Act of 1988 encouraged the further expansion of efforts
linking poverty reduction with welfare recipients' labor force
participation.
The economic expansion of the economy that the Reagan
administration enjoyed after the 1981 recession was interrupted
during the GH Bush Administration. The recession of 1990-91
paved the way in part for the advent of the Clinton administra-
Presidents, Profits, Productivity, & Poverty 7
tion. With a focus on deficit reduction, deregulation, and capital
gains tax cuts, the Clinton administration enjoyed another expan-
sion of the economy. Overall, the economic and social policies
of the Clinton administration primarily relied on market mecha-
nisms and looked to a growing economy to affect poverty rates,
exemplified in part by its expansion of the Earned Income Tax
Credit in 1993 to boost the work-effort and income levels of low-
income workers (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1998;
Economic Report of the President, 1994). The Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunities Act of 1996, which created the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program and
ended the entitlement nature of the Federal-State Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, explicitly aimed at,
among other things, welfare reduction more so than at poverty
reduction.
The Reagan administration can be viewed as a "great divide,"
relying more explicitly and ideologically on market mechanisms
and increased productivity rather than on government programs
per se to address social problems, with poverty reduction viewed
as a natural byproduct of a dynamic economy (Anderson, 1988;
Economic Report of the President, 1994; Feldstein, 1994a; Judis, 1988;
Madrick, 2003; Stein, 1984). The "great divide" also meant a
shift in emphasis from pre-Reagan fiscal policy to post-Reagan
monetary policy as the main mechanism by which the Federal
Government intervened in the economy. This study sought to test
the "great divide" thesis, that is, to determine how the ideological
shift regarding the proper role of government in the economy
and society that had accompanied the Reagan administration
and gained ascendancy thereafter affected poverty / inequality
between 1961 and 2002. In doing so, it assessed the extent to
which there were significant differences in a variety of macroe-
conomic indicators and Federal capacity by presidential terms.
The study provided an empirical basis for assessing the merits of
the ideological underpinnings of presidential economic rhetoric
and policies, with a particular focus on the relationship between
prosperity and poverty / inequality in the U.S. Study results
were intended to enable policymakers and others interested in
the amelioration of poverty to get a better sense of how strongly
the economic welfare of the nation coincided with poverty /
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inequality and what if any relationship existed between corporate
profits and poverty / inequality.
A wealth of popular and scholarly information about the state
of the economy, macroeconomic measures, and related polices
during the study period formed the backdrop of this study (see,
Bartlett and Steele, 1992 & 1994; Blinder, 1987; Caputo, 1994;
Feldstein, 1994a & b; Greider, 1987; Iceland, 2003; Krugman, 1990;
Lieberman, 1991; Stein, 1984; Stiglitz, 2003), as well as annual
issues of the Economic Report of the President. Many of the indices
of the nation's economic welfare used in this study appeared in
Stein's analysis of economic policy from the Roosevelt to the first
Reagan administrations. As noted, the present study went beyond
the Reagan administration, to the first two years of the GW Bush
administration. It began with the Kennedy administration rather
than with the Roosevelt administration, because poverty became
part of the national domestic policy agenda during the 1960s.
The present study also differed from Stein's, however, in part
by focusing more directly on the link between economic perfor-
mance and poverty and by including several measures of income
inequality. This study contrasted presidential economic rhetoric
and macroeconomic outcomes for approximately twenty years
before and after the so-called Reagan revolution that signaled
a transition from a political economy conducive to government
efforts aimed at income redistribution to assist those in economic
need to one more reliant on market mechanisms.
Method
Data
Unless otherwise noted, data were obtained from the Economic
Report of the President (2003). Other sources of data, as cited in
Table 1, were obtained from Federal Government Internet sites.
Measures
As can be seen from Table 1, most measures were self-
explanatory. Some discussion, however, was needed in regard
to several measures.
Corporate Profits. Corporate Profits A incorporated inventory
valuation and capital consumption adjustments and excluded tax
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Table 1
Study Measures
Measure Definition
Presidential Terms
Profits
Corporate Profits A'
Corporate Profits B2
Productivity
Growth Measures
Real Gross Domestic
Product3
Changes in Real Gross
Domestic Product
Output per hour4
Changes in Output per
hour'
Costs
Employee Compensation A'
Employee Compensation B2
Federal Corporate Profit Taxes
Poverty & Inequality
Individual/Family Poverty'
Family Inequality A6
Family Inequality B6
Kennedy (1960-63), Johnson (1963-
1968), Nixon (1969-1973), Ford
(1974-1976), Carter (1977-1980),
Reagan (1981-1988), Bush, GH (1989-
1992), Clinton (1993-2000), Bush, GW
(2001-Present)
Percent of National Income
Price per unit of Real Gross Product of
Non-financial Corporate Business [$s]
Billions of chained 1996 $s.
Percent change in Real Gross Domestic
Product from previous period
Output per hour of all persons,
non-farm business, 1992 = 100
Percent change in non-farm business
output per hour of all persons
Percent of National Income
Price per unit of Real Gross Product of
Non-financial Corporate Business [$s]
Percent of Corporate Profits B
Percent of individuals/families
with incomes below official poverty
thresholds
Gini Index
Ratio of aggregate shares of family
income of highest quintile to lowest
quintile
continued
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Measure Definition
Poverty & Inequality continued
Family Inequality C6
Other Measures
Federal Government Capacity
Debt
Surplus/Deficit
Receipts
Personal Income Taxes A7
Corporate Taxes 7
Social Security
Contributions7
Money Supply
Labor Force Participation
Personal Income Taxes B8
Personal Savings9
Unemployment
Unemployment Duration
Ratio of aggregate shares of family
income of top 5% of families to lowest
quintile
As Percent of Gross Domestic Product
As Percent of Gross Domestic Product
As Percent of Gross Domestic Product
As Percent of Total Revenue
As Percent of Total Revenue
As Percent of Total Revenue
Ml as Percent of Gross Domestic
Product
Labor force participation rate of all
civilians aged 16 or above
As Percent of Personal Revenue
As Percent of Disposable Income
Annual Unemployment Rate
Annual, Average Weeks
Sources: ' U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2003d;
2 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2 003g; 3 U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2003c; I Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 2003; 5 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003b; 6 U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 2003a; 7 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
2003b; 8 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2003f;
9 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2003e.
liabilities. Employee Compensation A included wage and salary
accruals, as well as supplements to wages and salaries such as
employer contributions to social insurance. Corporate Profits B
and Employee Compensation B were determined by using the
implicit price deflator for gross product of non-financial corporate
business divided by 100. Corporate Profits B also incorporated
inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments and
excluded tax liabilities. Compensation B incorporated unit labor
costs.
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Productivity. Productivity measures included Real Gross Do-
mestic Product, percent changes in Real Gross Domestic Product
from preceding periods, Output per Hour, and percent changes in
Output Per Hour. The chained estimates of Real Gross Domestic
Product were used rather than current dollars because they are
the best available method for comparing the level of a given series
at two points in time. For further related information regarding
chained estimates, see U.S Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis (2003a).
Poverty &Inequality. Two measures of poverty included percents
of individuals and families whose incomes fell below official
U.S. poverty thresholds. Income inequality included Family In-
equality A, measured as the Gini Index, a general measure of
inequality among all families. The Gini Index ranges from 0 when
all families have equal shares of income, to 1.0 when one family
has all the income and the rest none (Jones & Weinberg, 2000).
Income inequality also included Family Income Inequality B and
C. Family Income Inequality B comprised ratios of aggregate
shares of family income of the highest quintile to those of the
lowest quintile, while Family Income Inequality C comprised
those of the top five percent of families to those of the lowest
quintile.
Other Measures. Several measures captured Federal Govern-
ment capacity, including debt, surplus/deficits, and total receipts
as percents of GDP. The sources of Federal receipts (Personal
Income Taxes A, Corporate Taxes, and Social Security Contribu-
tions) as percents of total revenue were calculated from seasonally
adjusted annual data. Money supply (Ml) was included in part
because of the Federal Reserve Board's shift in emphasis from
money targeting in the pre-Reagan decades to interest targeting
during the Reagan administration and afterwards (Arestis &
Sawyer, 2003; Bernstein, 2001). Monetary policy is one of two
main mechanisms by which the Federal Government exerts con-
trol over the economy. Unlike the mechanism of fiscal policy,
which is subject to Congressional debate and approval, however,
monetary policy, for which the Federal Reserve Board has respon-
sibility, largely falls outside the political process per se.
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Procedures
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to determine dif-
ferences in each study measure by presidential term. Use of
ANOVAs by presidential administrations made possible com-
parisons within the pre- and post-Reagan periods as well as
between these two study periods. When statistically significant
differences were found overall on a measure, post hoc analyses
were done to determine differences between specific pairs of
presidential terms. The Scheffe post hoc procedure was used
when Levine's test of the null hypothesis for homogeneity of
variance was accepted and the Games-Howell procedure was
used when Levine's test of the null hypothesis for homogeneity
of variance was rejected.
Results
Differences in Economic Well-being by Presidential Terms
As can be seen in Table 2, ANOVA results showed that no
overall statistically significant differences by presidential terms
were found for percentage changes in GDP, percentage changes in
labor output per hour, or personal income taxes as a percent of per-
sonal income. Further, although an overall statistically significant
difference by presidential terms was found for Federal revenue
as a percent of GDP, post hoc analysis showed no such paired-
comparison differences. Statistically significant differences were
found for both measures of corporate profits, one measure of
productivity (Real GDP), all three measures of costs associated
with productivity, and all five measures of poverty and inequality,
as well as all other measures of economic well-being in the U.S.
Corporate Profits. Corporate profits as a percent of national in-
come ranged from a high of 8.6% under the Johnson adminis-
tration to a low of 6.1% under the GH Bush administration. They
were statistically indistinguishable during the Johnson, Kennedy,
and Clinton administrations. During the Clinton administration,
corporate profits as a percent of national income were greater than
those of the Reagan administration. No statistically significant
differences were found between the GW Bush administration and
any other presidential terms.
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Corporate profits as price per unit of Real GDP ranged from
a high of 7 cents during the Clinton administration to a low of
2 cents during the Nixon administration. They were statistically
indistinguishable during the Clinton and GW Bush administra-
tions. Corporate profits as price per unit of Real GDP were greater
during the Clinton administration than were those of the Reagan
and GH Bush administrations, which in turn had greater profits
than all other presidential terms, except as noted that of the GW
Bush administration. On the whole, corporation profits accounted
for greater shares of national income during the Democratic pres-
idential terms of Kennedy, Johnson, and Clinton, but in terms of
price per unit of Real GDP, corporations fared better during the
Clinton and GW Bush administrations.
Productivity. Real GDP ranged from a high of $9.3 trillion during
the GW Bush administration to a low of $2.6 trillion during the
Kennedy administration, as measured in chained 1996 dollars.
The GW Bush Administration had a higher Real GDP than that
of all other presidential terms. The Clinton administration had a
greater than Real GDP than that of the GH Bush administration,
which in turn had a higher Real GDP than that during the Reagan
administration. The Real GDP was statistically indistinguishable
during the Reagan, Carter, Ford, and Nixon administrations and
these were greater than that of the Johnson administration, which
in turn had a greater GDP than that of the Kennedy administra-
tion.
Statistically significant differences by presidential administra-
tion were also found in regard to output per hour of all persons in
non-farm businesses. Output her hour ranged from a high of 120.2
(with 100 = 1992) during the GW Bush administration to a low of
56.0 during the Kennedy administration. During the Clinton ad-
ministration it was greater than that of all other presidential terms,
with the exception of the GW Bush administration. Output per
hour during the GH Bush administration was greater than that
of the Reagan administration. During the Carter administration
it was statistically indistinguishable from that of the Ford and
Nixon administrations, all of which in turn had higher output
per hour than the Johnson and Kennedy administrations. Output
per hour during the Reagan administration was also greater than
that of the Nixon administration.
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
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On the whole, productivity as measured by Real GDP and
Output per Hour was highest in the GW Bush and Clinton ad-
ministrations. There was no statistically significant difference in
regard to the rate of change in either of these two measures
between any presidential terms.
In regard to costs associated with productivity, statistically
significant differences were found by presidential terms on all
three measures. Employee compensation as a percent of national
income ranged from a high of 73.5% during the Reagan adminis-
tration to a low of 68.8% during the Kennedy administration. It
was statistically indistinguishable among all presidential terms
from Nixon through GW Bush. All but the Clinton administra-
tion had higher employee compensation as a percent of national
income than that of the Johnson and Kennedy administrations,
whereas that of the Clinton administration was greater than that
of the Kennedy administration.
Employee compensation, as price per unit of Real Gross Profit
in non-financial corporate business, ranged from a high of 69 cents
during the GW Bush administration to a low of 18 cents during the
Kennedy Administration. It was statistically indistinguishable
during the GW Bush, Clinton, and GH Bush administrations.
Each of these presidential terms had greater such employee com-
pensation than that of the Reagan administration, which in turn
had a greater percentage than that of the Carter administration.
During the Carter administration such employee compensation
was comparable to that of the Ford administration, both of which
had higher levels than that of the Nixon administration, which in
turn had a higher level than those of the Johnson and Kennedy
administrations. In addition, employee compensation as price per
unit of Real Gross Profit was higher in the GW Bush administra-
tion than it was during the GH Bush administration and it was
higher in the Reagan administration than it was during the Ford
administration.
Finally, Federal corporate profit taxes as a percent of corpo-
rate profits ranged from a high of 46.9% during the GW Bush
administration to a low of 39.7% during the Kennedy administra-
tion. They were statistically indistinguishable among presidential
terms, with one exception: corporate profit taxes were higher
as a percent of corporate profits during the Nixon and Carter
administrations that during the Clinton administration.
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On the whole, workers fared much better in terms of their
compensation in the late 1980s and 1990s than they did during the
late 1970s and most of the 1980s, but even during the presidential
terms of Nixon and Carter they fared better than they did during
the Johnson and Kennedy administrations. As workers were do-
ing better, corporate taxes as a percent of their profits remained
relatively flat between 1961 and 2002, with the exception of the
Nixon and Ford administrations when they exceeded those of the
Clinton administration.
Poverty & Inequality. Rates of both individual and family poverty
ranged from highs of 20.8% and 17.7% respectively during the
Kennedy administration to lows of 11.9% and 9.4% during the
GW Bush administration. On both measures, the Kennedy admin-
istration had greater rates of poverty than all other presidential
administrations with the exception of the Johnson administration
from which it was statistically indistinguishable. The Reagan
administration nonetheless had higher rates of individual and
family poverty than those of the Ford administration, whose
rates of individual and family poverty were comparable to those
of the Carter, Nixon, and GW Bush administrations. The higher
individual and family poverty rates of the Reagan administration
were also comparable during the GH Bush, and Clinton admin-
istrations.
As measured by the Gini Coefficient, family inequality ranged
from a high of .43 during the Clinton administration to a low of
.35 during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. As the ratio of
aggregate shares of family income, families in the top five percent
of incomes and in the highest quintile earned highs of 4.8 and 11.1
more respectively than did families in the lowest quintile during
the Clinton administration, whereas they earned lows of 2.7 and
7.3 times more respectively during the Ford administration.
Although there was variation across presidential terms, fam-
ily inequality reached their highest levels on all three measures
during the Clinton administration, surpassing that of all other
presidential terms. It should be noted, that in the first year of
the GW Bush administration (the measures were unavailable for
the second year of the Bush Administration at the time of the
study), the measures of family inequality were quite close to and
slightly higher than those of the Clinton administration: .44 on the
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Gini Coefficient, 5.0 and 11.4 respectively on shares of aggregate
family income of top five percent and high quintile vs. the lowest
quintiles.
On the whole, rates of individual and family poverty were
highest in the 1960s, declined somewhat in the 1970s, but sta-
bilized upward in the 1980s and afterwards. Family inequality
increased during the Reagan and GH Bush administrations, but
increased even more during the Clinton administration.
Other Macroeconomic Measures. Measures related to Federal Gov-
ernment capacity included Federal debt, surplus/deficit, and re-
ceipt as percents of GDP, personal income taxes, corporate taxes,
and Social Security contributions as percents of Total Federal
Revenue. Government debt as a percent of GDP ranged from
a high of 45.6% during the Clinton administration to a low of
26.4% during the Ford administration. It was statistically indis-
tinguishable during the presidential terms of Clinton, GH Bush,
and Kennedy, all of whom had greater government debt to a
statistically significant degree than those of the Johnson, Reagan,
and GW Bush administrations, which in turn had statistically
significant higher percentages of debt than the comparable levels
during the Nixon, Carter and Ford administrations.
The government deficit as a percent of GDP ranged from a
high of 4.23% during the Reagan administration to a low of 0.76%
during the Clinton administration. It was statistically indistin-
guishable during the Reagan and GH Bush administrations, both
of which had statistically significant greater deficits than those
in the Johnson, Nixon, and Kennedy administrations. Deficits
during the Clinton administration were statistically comparable
to those of the GH Bush and GW Bush administrations.
Government receipts as a percent of GDP ranged from a high
of 19.1% during the Clinton administration to a low of 17.6%
during the Ford administration. Despite an overall statistically
significant difference in receipts as percents of GDP (F = 2.33, p <
.05), post hoc analysis indicated no statistical differences among
the cross comparisons between presidential terms.
On the whole, the Federal Government ran comparable debts
during the early and latter years of the study period, namely in the
1960s and in the 1980s and afterwards, while it ran greater deficits,
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as a percent of GDP, primarily during the Reagan administration.
Throughout the entire study period, Total Receipts, as a percent
of GDP, were comparable across presidential administrations.
Personal income taxes, as a percent of the Federal Govern-
ment's Total Revenue, ranged from a high of 41.0% during the
GW Bush administration to a low of 34.2% during the Johnson
administration. It was statistically indistinguishable during the
GW Bush and Clinton administrations. The Clinton administra-
tion received a greater portion of Total Revenue from personal
income taxes than that of the Johnson administration and the
Reagan administration received a greater portion than that of
the Kennedy, Ford, and Johnson administrations. No other dif-
ferences in personal income taxes as percents of Total Revenue
were found among other cross-paired comparisons of presiden-
tial terms.
Corporate taxes as a percent of Total Revenue ranged from a
high of 16.7% during the Johnson administration to a low of 7.0%
during the GW Bush administration. The Kennedy and Johnson
administrations generated statistically significant higher percent-
ages of Total Revenue from corporate taxes than the Nixon, Carter,
and Ford administrations. The Clinton, Reagan, GH Bush, and
GW Bush administrations generated comparable percentages of
Total Revenue from corporate taxes and these percentages were
in turn lower to a statistically significant degree than all other
cross-paired comparisons with other presidential terms.
Social Security contributions as a percent of Total Revenue
ranged from a high of 25.7% during the GH Bush administration
to a low of 13.1% during the Kennedy administration. During the
GH Bush, Clinton, and Reagan administrations they were greater
to a statistically significant degree than those of all other cross-
paired comparisons of presidential terms. The GW Bush admin-
istration had a greater percentage of Total Revenue from Social
Security contributions than the Carter administration. The Nixon
administration had a greater percentage than that of JFK. On the
whole, personal income taxes and Social Security contributions
increased as proportions of Total Revenue from the 1980s onward,
while those of corporate taxes declined.
Other macroeconomic measures included the MI supply of
money as a percent of GDP, labor force participation rates of all
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persons 16 years of age and older, personal income taxes as a
percent of personal revenue, personal savings as a percent of
personal disposable income, annual unemployment rates, and
average number of weeks unemployed per year. The M1 supply of
money ranged from a high of 13.9% of GDP during the Clinton ad-
ministration to a low of 5.6% during the Johnson administration.
It was more plentiful to a statistically significant degree during the
Clinton, GH Bush, GW Bush, and Reagan administrations than all
other presidential terms. M1 was more plentiful to a statistically
significant degree during the Carter and Ford administrations
compared to that of the Nixon administration, which in turn had
a greater M1 supply than the roughly comparable supplies in the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
The labor force participation rate ranged from a high of 10%
during the Clinton administration to a low of 58.9% during the
Kennedy administration. The Clinton, GW Bush, and GH Bush
administrations had higher rates than those of the Reagan, Carter,
Ford, and Nixon administrations, which, in turn, had higher
rates than did the Johnson and Kennedy administrations. On the
whole, the greater availability of money supply from the Reagan
administration onwards was accompanied by greater labor force
participation rates.
Personal income taxes as a percent of personal revenue ranged
from a high of 14.4% during the GW Bush and Carter adminis-
trations to a low of 9.3% during the GH Bush and Ford admin-
istrations. No statistically significant relationship was found in
regard to personal income as a percent of personal revenue by
presidential terms.
Personal savings as a percent of disposable income ranged
from high of 10.0% during the Ford administration to a low
of 3.0% during the GW Bush administration. The Ford, Nixon,
Carter, Reagan, Johnson, Kennedy, and GH Bush administrations
had higher percentages of personal savings rates than the com-
parable rates of the Clinton and GW Bush administrations. On
the whole, despite the greater availability of money supply and
greater labor force participation rates in the latter half of the study
period and despite the relatively stable level of personal income
taxes as a percent of personal revenue, personal savings were
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lowest throughout the 1990s, during the Clinton and GW Bush
administrations.
The unemployment rate ranged from a high of 8.1% during
the Ford administration to a low of 4.2% during the Johnson
administration. The Ford and Reagan administrations had higher
rates than that of the Johnson administration. Further, the Rea-
gan administration had higher unemployment rates than those
of the Clinton and Nixon administrations. No other differences
in unemployment rates were found among other cross-paired
comparisons of presidential terms.
The average number of weeks unemployed ranged from a
high of 15.8% per year during the Clinton administration to a
low of 9.9% during the Nixon administration. Duration of unem-
ployment during the Clinton and Reagan administrations was
longer than those of the Johnson and Nixon administrations.
No other differences in duration of unemployment were found
among other cross-paired comparisons of presidential terms. On
the whole, the improving economy and greater availability of
money supply from the Reagan Administration onwards was
accompanied by higher rates of unemployment during the 1980s
and longer duration of unemployment spells during the 1990s.
Discussion
Results of this study indicate that the "great divide" thesis
regarding the U.S. economy before and after the Reagan admin-
istration depends on which measure of the economy is the focus of
attention. In addition, on some measures where before and after
differences are detected, the nature of those differences is para-
doxical. Further, findings provide some evidence corroborating
neoclassic economic theory in regard to incentives and produc-
tivity and they present a challenge to activists who equate income
inequality and poverty as natural or inevitable byproducts of the
more market-driven fiscal and monetary policies of the 1980s and
1990s.
Measures supporting the thesis include Corporate Profits
as a percent of GDP, Real GDP, Output per Hour, Employee
Compensation, Income Inequality, Federal Deficits, Personal and
24 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Corporate Income Taxes, Social Security contributions, Labor
Force Participation, Ml Money Supply, Unemployment Rates,
and Duration of Unemployment. Measures not supporting the
thesis include Corporate Profits as a Share of National Income,
Corporate Taxes, changes in Real GDP and Output per Hour,
Individual and Family Poverty, Federal Debt, and Total Federal
Revenues.
Findings of this study indicate that corporate profits ac-
counted for greater shares of national income during the Demo-
cratic presidential terms of Kennedy, Johnson, and Clinton. This
finding is consistent with Varian (2003) who reported results of
a study showing that investments in stocks outperformed bonds
under Democrats rather than under Republican presidents. In
addition, corporate taxes as a percent of their profits remained
relatively flat between 1961 and 2002, with the exception of the
Nixon and Ford administrations when they exceeded those of the
Clinton administration. In regard to corporate profits as a share of
national income and corporate taxes as a percent of their profits,
the "great divide" thesis does not hold.
In terms of corporate profits as a percent of Real GDP, how-
ever, findings of this study show that corporations fared better
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, especially during the Clinton and
GW Bush administrations. These findings indicate that economic
welfare measured by Real GDP and corporate profits were more
closely tied together following the Reagan administration than
prior to it. The "great divide" thesis holds. Overall, these findings
suggest that whether Democrats or Republicans occupy the White
House corporations benefit relative to Real GDP whenever the
virtues of market mechanisms are extolled and form the basis of
economic policies.
In regard to productivity, the "great divide" thesis gets mixed
support. Findings show that productivity as measured by Real
GDP and Output per Hour were highest in the GW Bush and
Clinton administrations, but there were no statistically significant
differences found in regard to the rate of change on either of
these two measures between any presidential terms. That is,
productivity increased constantly, but it did so at an even rate
that did not correlate with presidential administrations. Hence,
the size of the economy and level of worker output per hour were
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greater after than before the Reagan administration, supporting
the "great divide" thesis. Nonetheless, the relatively similar rates
of change on each of these measures between presidential terms
cast doubts on the "great divide" thesis.
Findings indicate that workers fared much better in terms
of their compensation in the late 1980s and 1990s than they did
during the late 1970s and most of the 1980s. In addition, findings
indicate that workers' shares of national income were paradox-
ically higher during Republican administrations than the ear-
lier Democratic administrations and to a lesser extent than the
Clinton administration when corporate shares were highest. In
regard to workers' compensation, the "great divide" thesis for
the most part holds. These findings are consistent with related
results showing the greater availability of the M1 supply of money
from the Reagan administration onwards and the greater labor
force participation rates. After the inflationary 1970s, Federal
Reserve efforts to curb inflation and lower interest rates made
more money available, which invariably contributed to increasing
productivity and wages, as well as to drawing proportionately
more of the working age population into the labor force. Over-
all, findings about workers' compensation and corporate profits
corroborate neoclassical economic theory regarding incentives
and productivity. They provide some evidence for the "great
divide" thesis: fiscal and monetary policies since the Reagan
administration sought and apparently achieved a better match
between increasing productivity and its rewards to corporations
and workers in the aggregate. It should be noted, however, that
total compensation, which includes fringe benefits, is not the same
as wages, which declined or remained flat from the late 1970s
through the mid-1990s (Bernstein & Mishel, 1997).
In regard to poverty and inequality, findings indicate that
the rates of individual and family poverty were highest in the
1960s, declined somewhat in the 1970s, but they stabilized up-
ward in the 1980s and afterwards. Findings also indicated that
family inequality increased during the Reagan and GH Bush
administrations, but increased even more during the Clinton
administration. These findings in part contradict Stiglitz (2003)
who claimed that poverty was reduced and inequality halted
during the Clinton administration (p. xxi). Rather, they support
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both neoclassical economic theory and the "great divide" the-
sis in regard to inequality: inequality substantially increased, as
did the economy, more so after the Reagan administration than
before it. Findings, however, did not support the "great divide"
thesis in regard to individual and family poverty, both of which
stabilized upward in the 1980s and afterwards. They suggest on
one hand that increasing productivity is insufficient to mitigate
poverty rates and on the other hand that increased income in-
equality among families need not be accompanied by increased
individual or family poverty. This is not to say that it does not
matter if rich people get richer as long as poor people hold
their own economically or move above the poverty line. These
findings do suggest that redistributive arguments cast in zero-
sum terms between inequality and poverty might be a harder
sell even as a social justice issue (Nathanson, 1998). To the extent
that increased income inequality is not accompanied by increased
individual or family poverty rates, social welfare advocates and
policy makers may want to focus on reducing poverty rather than
income inequality as a social problem during times of economic
expansion.
In regard to Federal capacity, findings indicate that the Federal
Government ran comparable debts, as a percent of GDP, during
the early and latter years of the study period, namely in the 1960s,
the 1980s and afterwards, and that it ran greater deficits, also as
a percent of GDP, primarily during the Reagan administration.
As GDP increases, so does the national debt, signifying that
presidential fiscal policies have been fairly consistent over the
past four decades with national debt and GDP roughly balanced.
In regard to national debt, the "great divide" thesis does not
hold. Unlike debt, which is a cumulative sum that the nation
owes its creditors, surplus/deficits reflect deviations from annual
budgets. Findings suggest that the amount of national debt per
se need not be problematic to the extent it remains a relatively
constant proportion of GDP. To the extent the nation borrows
money to pay for annual deficits, however, the nation's debt
increases. Whether or not the nation's productivity can increase
sufficiently to generate the funds necessary to meet the Social
Security obligations of the Baby Boom generation in the absence
of other programmatic changes is uncertain at best.
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Findings also indicate that Total Receipts, as a percent of
GDP, were comparable between presidential terms throughout
the entire study period. The "great divide" thesis does not hold
for Total Receipts. Nonetheless, results show that personal income
taxes and Social Security contributions increased as proportions
of Total Revenue from the 1980s onward, while those of corporate
taxes as a proportion of Total Revenue declined. As Friedman
(2003) also documents, there has been a role-reversal regarding
Social Security contributions and corporate income taxes as shares
of Federal tax receipts, with corporate income taxes reaching its
peak of 32% of Federal tax revenues in 1952 to just over 7% in
2003 and payroll taxes representing about 10% of Federal tax
revenues in 1952 and 40% in 2003. The "great divide" notion does
not hold in regard to the components of Total Revenue. These
findings suggest that the favorable tax treatment the Federal
Government gave to corporations over the past two decades was
accompanied, as previously noted, by greater levels of GDP, as
well as of employee compensation, but also by greater income
inequality without any discernable reduction in poverty rates.
Workers may have benefited from higher levels of compensation
in the post-Reagan era, but their take home pay was partially
eroded by increased income and payroll taxes, while corporations
enjoyed the dual rewards of lower taxes and higher profits.
Finally, costs associated with greater levels of GDP, employee
compensation, and labor force participation rates since the 1980s
include higher rates of unemployment during the 1980s and
longer duration of unemployment spells and lower levels of
personal savings throughout 1990s. These findings support the
"great divide" thesis and represent the downside of efforts relying
primarily on market forces to increase productivity. Nonetheless,
given these costs, especially higher unemployment rates and
greater duration of unemployment, it is all the more remarkable
that individual and family poverty rates remained relatively flat
once they stabilized upwards in the 1980s and afterwards from
the 1970s rates but still below the 1960s rates. A question policy
makers and others must face is whether the overall benefits of the
economy throughout the 1980s and 1990s were good enough. For
many they are not (e.g., Goolsbee, 2003; Roach, 2003) and to the
extent that structural changes in the economy portend decreases
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in the rates of job creation, the future holds less promise in the
absence of government intervention (Groshen & Potter, 2003).
Perhaps costs associated with reducing individual and family
poverty rates, however, are more than the country is willing to
bear.
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